

BLUEHAT SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE

Scaling AppSec With an SDL for Citizen Development

Michael Bargury, Zenity, @mbrg0 Don Willits, Microsoft, @DonWIllits66

55K devs



55K devs 90K copilots



55K devs 90K copilots 500K apps








55K devs 90K copilots 500K apps 1.1M automations 10M creds



~2M ~apps 10M creds



Agenda

- 1. WHY so many devs/apps/creds/vulns?
- 2. WHY are these important?
- 3. HOW to fail at AppSec
- 4. HOW we made it work
- 5. Takeaways





Our team



Jake Visser
Principal Architect Manager,
Microsoft Security



Andrew Leeland
Senior Security Engineer,
Microsoft Security



PJ Fox
Senior Program Manager,
Microsoft Security



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Principal Program Manager,
Microsoft Security



Lee Peterson
Principal Manager, Microsoft
Security

Our team



Don Willits @donwillits66

Power Platform Security Architect, Microsoft Security Contributor, OWASP Low-Code/No-Code Top 10

Securing Microsoft's internal Power Platform environment



Michael Bargury @mbrg0
CTO & Co-Founder, Zenity
Project lead, OWASP Low-Code/No-Code
Top 10
Frequent speaker at BlackHat, Defcon,
RSAC, elsewhere
Ex-Microsoft

Our team


Applying AppSec to citizen development within the Microsoft environment

- Have been working together for >2y
- Started with securing Microsoft's Power Platform environment
- Expanding across LCNC platforms
- Focused on unintended consequences of citizen development
- Continuously identify and remediate security risk
- Collaborated on OWASP LCNC Top 10



WHY so many devs/apps/creds?

Building has never been easier



Everyone is a developer

COVID health check app





Starting June 1, 2022, FTEs and external staff with @microsoft.com accounts must sign-in from either Microsoft issued/imaged devices or Intune enrolled devices. Learn more

Take the daily COVID-19 check



Your health and well-being are important. Each day, before entering Microsoft facilities, you'll be required to complete a screening based on local requirements. We'll ask a couple of questions and it should only take a minute.

It looks like your current location is near **Giv'atayim**, **Tel Aviv**, **Israel** . If this isn't correct, please change your location

What does Microsoft do with the information?

Get started

For issues or concerns contact IT Global Helpdesk globalhd@microsoft.com
Microsoft Data Privacy Notice Identity Terms of Use Feedback

Your business is already there, it's time for security to keep up











W












"We are going to have 500 million applications that are going to get created, new, by 2023. Just to put that in perspective, that's more than all of the applications that were created in the last 40 years."


Satya Nadella, Microsoft Ignite 2019

Enters GenAl.

Enters GenAl.




Enters GenAl.



Microsoft alone has 1.7M assets today, and growing...







WHY are these important?

Story #1 – Community website







Customer Service

4

by Salesforce

Get Started

About This Template

Create a responsive site that lets members post questions, access relevant content and records, view articles, collaborate, and create support cases.

Features

Self-Service

Give access to articles, Q&A, and cases.

Collaboration

Use groups, discussions, and topics to organize content and solve issues quickly.

Customization

Use Experience Builder to brand your site, add ready-made Lightning components, and take advantage of custom Lightning components, layouts, and themes.

Intelligence

Personalize the member experience, automatically escalate important cases, and create a safe haven with rules to keep out trolls and bots.

PwnRobotsSpareParts

About Us Products Partners

About Us

At PwnRobotsSpareParts, we specialize in providing high-quality spare parts for robotics in the defense sector. Our mission is to support the ongoing advancements in robotic technologies, ensuring reliability and performance.



Products

- High-Precision Actuators
- Robust Sensors
- · Durable Power Supplies
- · Advanced Control Systems


Success Stories


We have the most amazing companies as our customers, working together to innovate and enhance robotic technologies. Feel free to read more information about our success stories.


Success Stories


© 2024 PwnRobotsSpareParts. All rights reserved.






























Story #2 – AskHR Copilot






















Publish AI skill

Once your AI skill is published, you will get a URL you can use to connect to it.




Cancel






AskHR Copilot – findings

Sensitive data publicly accessible (Data Leakage)




```
→ power-pwn git:(main) x
→ power-pwn git:(main) x
→ power-pwn git:(main) x python src/powerpwn/main.py copilot-studio-hunter -h
t2`24 edition
usage: main.py copilot-studio-hunter [-h] {deep-scan,enum} ...
Scan, enumerate and recon Copilot Studio bots.
positional arguments:
  {deep-scan,enum} copilot_studio_subcommand
                  Starts a recon deep scan based on a domain or tenant. Requires FFUF to be installed.
   deep-scan
                  Starts enumerating for Azure tenant IDs or environments IDs. Requires AMASS to be installed.
   enum
optional arguments:
                  show this help message and exit
 -h, --help
→ power-pwn git:(main) x python src/powerpwn/main.py copilot-studio-hunter deep-scan -h
```


Story #3 – productivity sync





• Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
















- Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)



Everyone means EVERYONE, including guests by-default




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



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
Check out the talk **All You Need Is Guest BHUSA 2023** for an attacker's perspective!











- Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)
- Personal data leaks to logs (Data Leakage)




User data written to logs



Builder has direct access







Command Prompt - powerpw 🔨 👚 🔻

C:\powerpwn-blackhat>powerpwn phishing install-app --tenant "fc993b0f-345b-4d01-9f67-9ac4a140dd43" -e "Default-fc993b0f-345b-4d01-9f67-9ac4a140dd43" --input "C:\Users\User\Downloads\Shoutout_20230729151109.zip" -n "Shoutouts"

2023-08-10 21:32:24 | powerpwn | INFO | Acquiring token with scope=https://service.powerapps.com/.default from cached refresh token.



- Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)
- Personal data leaks to logs (Data Leakage)
- PrivEsc path (Account Impersonation)



App operates on behalf of user




Builder can operate on behalf of users



- Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
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
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
Story #4 – a persistent vendor

 Vendor John's contract has expired, Entra ID account disabled






- Vendor John's contract has expired, Entra ID account disabled
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 - One for his place of business which can STILL edit the flow using his Contoso Credentials





- Vendor John's contract has expired, Entra ID account disabled
- Before that happened, John added two identities:
 - One for his place of business which can STILL edit the flow using his Contoso Credentials
 - One for his own personal account. It can only run the flow and collect the data it generates.





A persistent vendor – findings

Unintended or malicious access to sensitive data

Not exclusive to vendors!
...but a very common "use case"

• Without inspecting each and every app/flow/copilot/etc. created by Vendors/others...

...very hard to find!



Recap

We are leaving heavy security decisions in the hands of business users

When choosing between productivity and security, the choice is obvious

HOW to fail at AppSec

Or – what didn't work



(Blindly) Follow best practice

- 1. Focus on crown jewels
- 2. Get developer buy-in
- 3. Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)

1. Focus on crown jewels



1. Focus on crown jewels

Everything is connected to critical business apps..

Number of active creds:

Office 365 1.4M

SharePoint 1.35M

Outlook 1.1M

SQL Server 280K

Excel 140K

EntralD 130K

OneDrive 125K

Azure DevOps 124K


• • •

- 1. Focus on crown jewels
- 2. Get developer buy-in



- 1. Focus on crown jewels
- 2. Get developer buy-in

Can we really expect business users to know how store PCI?






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
Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Practices

It's been 20 years since we introduced the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)—a set of practices and tools that help developers build more secure software. While the goal has not changed, the cyber security landscape on how software and services are built and deployed has.


Learn about the practices of the SDL, and how to implement them in your organization.



 Written for Code – LC/NC hides the complexity (and power!) of these tools



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- CodeQL (& SAST/DAST/IAST tooling in general) doesn't "speak" LC/NC





- Written for Code LC/NC hides the complexity (and power!) of these tools
- CodeQL (& SAST/DAST/IAST tooling in general) doesn't "speak" LC/NC
- SDL content not written for business user,
 e.g. Citizen Developer

Practice 2

Require use of proven security features, languages, & frameworks

This practice focuses on ensuring developmen foundation, and experience has taught us that effort.

Additionally, some aspects of software design associated and necessary logging for auditing approach, that provides clear consistent guida

Additionally, you should define and publish a l strive to use the latest version of approved too

2.1 Identity - Ensure users are using strong authentication and only have the level of permissions suitab

Managed Identities (instead of SAS tokens) - Managed Identities for Azure.

- Microsoft Learn: What are managed identities for Azure resources
- Microsoft DevBlogs: <u>Managing secrets securely in the cloud</u>

Secure Credential Storage (KeyVault / HSM)- Implement a mechanism to inventory, monitor, maintain, a sensitive configuration information in code or configuration files of the code. Never store passwords or unprotected locations. Production secrets should not be used for development or testing.


- Microsoft Learn: Azure Key Vault
- Microsoft Learn: <u>Safe storage of app secrets in development in ASP.NET Core</u>


Use Standard Identity Libraries (MSAL): The Microsoft Authentication Library (MSAL) enables developers be used to provide secure access to Microsoft Graph, other Microsoft APIs, third-party web APIs, or your

- Microsoft Learn: Overview of the Microsoft Authentication Library (MSAL)
- Microsoft Learn: Public client and confidential client applications
- Microsoft Learn: Acquire and cache tokens using the Microsoft Authentication Library (MSAL)



Pro Code SDLC





Business



- Written for Code LC/NC hides the complexity (and power!) of these tools
- CodeQL (& SAST/DAST/IAST tooling in general) doesn't "speak" LC/NC
- SDL content not written for business user,
 e.g. Citizen Developer
- Inconsistent CI/CD adoption (use ALM/pipelines!)



Sure, Let Business Users Build Their Own. What Could Go Wrong?
Michael Bargury, BlackHat USA 2023




Stuck at get-go

- 1. Focus on crown jewels
- 2. Get developer buy-in
- 3. Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)



Building has never been easier



If building is easy, shouldn't fixing vulns be easy too...?

Remove unused credentials

Sanitize logs

Sanitize inputs

AUTO-FIX

Change configs

Turn on logs

Use secure properties



Auto-fix -> Early success

Auto-fix -> Early success

Early success → Buy-in

Auto-fix → Early success

Early success → Buy-in

Buy-in → World domination ;)


Auto-fix → Early success

Early success → Buy-in

Buy-in

World domination

Scale it



HOW we made it work

• Remediate all vulnerabilities (Get-to-Green/Stay-Green)

- Remediate all vulnerabilities
- With 2-3 dedicated headcounts




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- Were given 6 months; we finished in a little over 4 months

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- Minimum viable product / Self-serve

Minimum Viable Product

 Remediation Guidance: Write it for the business user, not a technical developer





- Remediate all vulnerabilities
- With 2-3 dedicated headcounts
- Were given 6 months; we finished in a little over 4 months
- Minimum viable product / Self-serve
- Auto-fix (where possible)



Minimum Viable Product

Automatic Remediation: Is the security violation auto-fixable?



Minimum Viable Product

- Automatic Remediation: Is the security violation auto-fixable?
 - Do we have enough context?
 - Can Zenity put the asset in a secure state?

- Automatic Remediation: Is the security violation auto-fixable?
 - Do we have enough context?
 - Can Zenity put the asset in a secure state?
 - If YES... we trigger correcting the misconfiguration silently while the developer sleeps



- Balance a reasonable time to fix before we "shift + delete" in secure assets (Apps, Flows, etc.)
 - We settled on "30 days-to-fix" as a reasonable compromise providing "just enough time" vs. "not too much time"



 Brownfield: Pre-existing risk/security violations created on or before Jan 1st, 2024 (when our campaigns started)


a.k.a. "Get to Green"

- Brownfield: Pre-existing risk/security violations created on or before Jan 1st, 2024 (when our campaigns started)
- Greenfield: Net new risk created continuously/daily in our tenant after Jan 1st, 2024


a.k.a. "Stay Green"




Early Success led to longer campaigns



Self Service – SharePoint List of Instructions



Self Service – Step-by-Step Instructions






Self Service – Email


- 1st mail goes out
- Redirects user to Violations
 Dashboard (PowerApp)
 - Manage all their violations

- 30 days-to-fix
- Goes to both Creator and Current
 Owners of the asset




Self Service – Final Email


Final Warning mail




Self Service – Violations Dashboard



Self Service – Violations Dashboard Details




Self Service – Violations Dashboard Remediation





Playbooks

- •Greenfield: As new violations come in...
- •Brownfield: When we send out bulk emails to burn down preexisting risk...
- •If rule ID is XYZ, and other condition(s) are true...
 ...then take these actions






Results


- Jan 18th, 2024 April 30th, 2024
 - Prove we can scale-up
 - Prove we can Get-to-Green in two environments
 - Prove we can Get-to-Green and Stay-Green with identical tooling and processes



SUCCESS



SUCCESS



* Never get to 100% remediated because of 30 days-to-fix





Takeaways

What did we learn from this?

• Leverage industry-standard security risk categorization



OWASP Top 10 for Low-Code/No-Code

- LCNC01: Account Impersonation
- LCNC02: Authorization Misuse
- LCNC03: Data Leakage and Unexpected Consequences
- LCNC04: Authentication and Secure Communication Failures
- LCNC05: Security Misconfiguration
- LCNC06: Injection Handling Failures
- LCNC07: Vulnerable and Untrusted Components
- LCNC08: Data and Secret Handling Failures
- LCNC09: Asset Management Failures
- LCNC10: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures



OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Models

- LLM01: Prompt Injection
- LLM02: Insecure Output Handling
- LLM03: Training Data Poisoning
- LLM04: Model Denial of Service
- LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
- LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure
- LLM07: Insecure plugin design
- LLM08: Excessive Agency
- LLM09: Overreliance
- LLM10: Model Theft

As LC/NC platforms increasingly embrace AI, this will become increasingly relevant



What did we learn from this?

- ✓ Leverage industry-standard security risk categorization
- Prioritize what we want to fix first



6 Risk Reduction Campaigns

Merged similar OWASP Top 10 categories together & reviewed SDL gap analysis

 Also pivoted on Senior Leadership Team priorities "Oversharing..." and "Sensitive data..." sound identical, but there were enough distinctions in the scanning ruleset that they were distinct campaigns.

Campaigns included:

- Guest/Access Control
- AI/Copilot issues
- Oversharing of data
- Sensitive Data Leakage
- Hardcoded Secrets
- Misconfig & Miscellany





What did we learn from this?

- ✓ Leverage industry-standard security risk categorization
- ✓ Prioritize what we want to fix first
- Shared Responsibility Model

Serverless

Data

Biz logic

Access

Code

Identity

Runtime

• • •

Customer

Platform





Data

Biz logic

Access

Code

Identity

Runtime

• • •

LCNC

Data

Biz logic

Access

Code

Identity


Runtime

• • •

Customer

Platform

We must own our side of the Shared Responsibility Model



Sure, let business users build they own. What could go wrong?

Data

Biz logic

Customer

Access

Code

Identity

Runtime

Platform

• • •

Sure, let business users build they own. What could go wrong?

Data

Biz logic

Access

Code

Identity

Runtime

• • •

Customer

Platform

- Are apps moving data outside of the corp boundary?
- Are users over-sharing data?
- Are we allowing external access?
- Are we properly handling secrets and sensitive data?
- Do apps have business logic vulns?

• ...

Sure, let business users build they own. What could go wrong?

Data

Biz logic

Access

Code

Identity

Runtime

• • •

Customer

Platform

- Are apps moving data outside of the corp boundary?
- Are users over-sharing data?
- Are we allowing external access?
- Are we properly handling secrets and sensitive data?
- Do apps have business logic vulns?

• ...

Who owns AppSec for apps built by business users?



Shared Responsibility Model for LC/NC

			Role Accountability		
Domain	Responsibility	LC/NC Dev.			LC/NC Platform
Access Control	Identity, Access Control	√			
Access Control	Sharing, Ownership	√			
Business Logic	Connectivity, Integration, Plugins, & Agents	√			
Business Logic	Data flows, Control Flows, Integration	√			
Data Management	Data and Secret Handling	√			•
Data Management	Data Governance	√			
Data Management	Encryption	√			•
Governance	Application Security / Risk Assessment	0	•	√	
Governance	Developer Lifecycle Governance	0	•	√	
Governance	Developer Training and accountability	0	•	√	
LC/NC Platform	Hygiene Management		•		√
LC/NC Platform	LC/NC Platform configuration, policies, settings, security controls		•	•	√
Platform(s)	Harden other services besides LC/NC Platform		<other Admins></other 	0	
		1			
		\checkmark	Directly accountable/responsible		
		•	Responsible (in partnership)		
		0	Consulted/Informed, may take some action		


What are the priorities?

- ✓ Leverage industry-standard security risk categorization
- ✓ Prioritize what we want to fix first
- ✓ Shared Responsibility Model
- De-facto SDL enforcement

Remember this gap analysis?

 Successful SDL uses automation for the more technical requirements

- Our processes give us "de-facto"
 SDL across our corporate
 network
 - Sorry, no Threat Models. 😊



What did we learn from this?

- ✓ Leverage industry-standard security risk categorization
- ✓ Prioritize what we want to fix first
- ✓ Shared Responsibility Model
- ✓ De-facto SDL enforcement

Conclusion

Resources

- Product docs
- •SDL: microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl
- Top 10 for LC/NC: <u>owasp.org/lowcodenocode</u>
- •Top 10 for LLM <u>Ilm.owasp.org</u>
- LCNC Shared Responsibility Model Whitepaper (forthcoming)

Full writeup labs.zenity.io/p/bluehat24

In conclusion...

Low-Code/No-Code is a powerful and prolific tool in an Enterprise

But the shared responsibility model is not necessarily recognized

You CAN build a successful program at scale

We happened to use Zenity, but that's not a prerequisite

You can get both Productivity and improved Security

Greater parity with the SDL is possible



Thank you

