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Sure, Let Business Users Build Their Own. What Could Go Wrong?

Michael Bargury @ Zenity BSidesLV 2023

Hi there

- CTO and Co-founder @ Zenity
- OWASP LCNC Top 10 project lead
- Dark Reading columnist
- Defcon, BSides, RSAC, OWASP
- Hiring top researchers, engs & pms!



@mbrg0



github.com/mbrg



darkreading.com/author/michael-bargury



Agenda

- 1. Business users are building their own
- 2. What could go wrong?
- 3. How can we fix it?




Enterprise LCNC - EVERYONE is a Developer

Business Needs >>>> IT Capacity



Sure, Let Business Users Build Their Own. What Could Go Wrong?



Environment

Source: @RezaDorrani

@mbrg0 #BHUSA@BlackHatEvents

Is this actually being used?




Credential
Sharing as a
Service: The Dark
Side of No Code

Michael Bargury RSAC 2023

~8M active Power devs today!

More MSFT low-code devs than .NET devs, today!





Credential
Sharing as a
Service: The Dark
Side of No Code

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What could go wrong?

OWASP LCNC Top 10

- LCNC-SEC-01: Account Impersonation
- LCNC-SEC-02: Authorization Misuse
- LCNC-SEC-03: Data Leakage and Unexpected Consequences
- LCNC-SEC-04: Authentication and Secure Communication Failures
- LCNC-SEC-05: Security Misconfiguration
- LCNC-SEC-06: Injection Handling Failures
- LCNC-SEC-07: Vulnerable and Untrusted Components
- LCNC-SEC-08: Data and Secret Handling Failures
- LCNC-SEC-09: Asset Management Failures
- LCNC-SEC-10: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures








Real-world stories





Story #1 - employee onboarding





















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Data accessible to all (Authorization Misuse)











- Data accessible to all (Authorization Misuse)
- Sensitive data in plain text (Data and Secret Handling Failures)




Environment Zenity Stage (default) Power Apps | Employee Onboarding **Employee onboarding form** Full legal name **Daniel Wood** _ <u>.</u> New York 3rd street Address == 11 Jan 1990 Date of birth Danielw124@gmail.coi Personal email Phone number 202-555-0117 Social Security 78-05-1120 Number Save



Sure, Let Business Users Build Their Own. What Could Go Wrong?





- Data accessible to all (Authorization Misuse)
- Sensitive data in plain text (Data and Secret Handling)

Failures)


 Sensitive data written to logs (Data Leakage)

```
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"_owningbusinessunit_value": "edfdf52a-e501-ec11-94ee-0022488300bc",
"_owningbusinessunit_value@Microsoft.Dynamics.CRM.lookuplogicalname": "bu
 _owningbusinessunit_type": "businessunits",
"statecode": 0,
"_statecode_label": "Active",
"cr6e4 sensitiveinputid": "f1ef4327-4135-ee11-bdf4-6045bd8f7e0b",
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"_statuscode_label": "Active",
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"_createdby_type": "systemusers",
"cr6e4_dateofbirth": "10.10.1990",
" ownerid value": "b3671a7c-c17d-ec11-8d21-000d3a2f76f7",
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 _ownerid_type": "systemusers",
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"cr6e4 address": "116 E 60TH ST NEW YORK USA",
"cr6e4_name": "Daniel Wood",
 _modifiedby_value": "b3671a7c-c17d-ec11-8d21-000d3a2f76f7",
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 _modifiedby_type": "systemusers",
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"ItemInternalId": "f1ef4327-4135-ee11-bdf4-6045bd8f7e0b",
"SdkMessage": "Create".
"RunAsSystemUserId": "b3671a7c-c17d-ec11-8d21-000d3a2f76f7",
"RowVersion": "12774383"
```

- Data accessible to all (Authorization Misuse)
- Sensitive data in plain text (Data and Secret Handling Failures)
- Sensitive data written to logs (Data Leakage)



Story #2 – productivity sync




Productivity sync – findings

Productivity sync – findings

Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)



















Sync Outlook history to Gmail

Email address


Text input

How many emails to sync


Text input

Sync your email






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


Sure, Let Business Users Build Their Own. What Could Go Wrong?




- Data Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)

Everyone means EVERYONE, including guests by-default




- Data Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)


Everyone means
EVERYONE, including
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



Check out the talk *All You Need Is Guest* for an attacker's perspective!












- Data Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)
- Personal data leaks to logs (Data Leakage)





Builder has direct access





Phishing made easy

Can we fool users to create connections for us?

- Set up a bait app that does something useful
- Generate connections on-the-fly
- Fool users to use it
- Pwn their connection (i.e. account)

Low Code High Risk: Enterprise Domination via Low Code Abuse

Michael Bargury
DEFCON 30

Check out power-pwn on GitHub!



- Data Business data to personal account (Data Leakage)
- Share with Everyone (Authorization Misuse)
- Personal data leaks to logs (Data Leakage)









Story #3 - self-service

What happens when a maker leaves the org?


What happens when a maker leaves the org?

Asset Management Failures







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


SOC Panics!





 App embedded with admin ID (Account Impersonation)





Sure, Let Business Users Build Their Own. What Could Go Wrong?





- App embedded with admin ID (Account Impersonation)
- IDOR (Injection handling failures)



- App embedded with admin ID (Account Impersonation)
- IDOR (Injection handling failures)

Recap:


- We are leaving heavy security decisions in the hands of business users
- When choosing between productivity and security, the choice is obvious

We've given business users:

- Dev-level power
- Missing best practice
- No controls
- No guardrails

We've given business users:

- Dev-level power
- Missing best practice
- No controls
- No guardrails



Could we really expect anything else?

How can we fix it? (Or: LCNC AppSec)

AppSec for, well, traditional apps AppSec for LCNC apps

AppSec for, well, traditional apps

AppSec for LCNC apps

1. Pro devs w/ some awareness

1. Business users w/ no awareness

AppSec for, well, traditional apps

AppSec for LCNC apps

1. Pro devs w/ some awareness

1. Business users w/ no awareness

2. Secure SDLC

2. No SDLC

AppSec for, well, traditional apps

AppSec for LCNC apps

1. Pro devs w/ some awareness

1. Business users w/ no awareness

2. Secure SDLC

2. No SDLC

3. Secure controls

3. Most controls don't apply

AppSec for, well, traditional apps

AppSec for LCNC apps

1. Pro devs w/ some awareness

1. Business users w/ no awareness

2. Secure SDLC

2. No SDLC

3. Secure controls

3. Most controls don't apply

4. Hundreds of apps / year

4. 10x-100x more apps / year

AppSec for LCNC apps

- 1. Business users w/ no awareness
- 2. No SDLC
- 3. Most controls don't apply
- 4. 10x-100x more apps / year

AppSec for LCNC apps

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Example Attack & Misuse Scenarios - Business Users

Scenario #1

A developer builds a No Code/Low Code Robotic Process Automation (RPA) application that connects to a database to update records. The connection uses the Admin's authentication (username and password) to log updates. Although 10 different users use this RPA process, all actions are being recorded as being done by the Admin. Logging systems can no longer track productivity, attribute errors to specific users, or identify malicious behavior.

Scenario #2

A developer builds an application to help the sales team in the field. The developer uses their credentials (username and password) when writing the application, so all sales made through the application are attributed to the developer, not the sales person facilitating the sale.

OWASP LCNC Top 10 sections for business users by John McTiernan and Yianna Paris @punk_fairybread

AppSec for LCNC apps

- 1. Business users w/ no awareness
- 2. No SDLC
- 3. Most controls don't apply
- 4. 10x-100x more apps / year

LCNC Security Standard:

- Approved use cases
- SDLC
- Environments
- Testing
- Monitoring
- SBOM
- •

AppSec for LCNC apps

- 1. Business users w/ no awareness
- 2. No SDLC
- 3. Most controls don't apply
- 4. 10x-100x more apps / year

```
When a row is added, modified or deleted
When a row is added, modified or deleted
     "headers": {
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         "Host": "prod-52.westeurope.logic.azure.com",
         "x-ms-correlation-request-id": "d7b3daa4-0bba-4724-918b-4523e1bb2e75",
         "x-ms-client-request-id": "d7b3daa4-0bba-4724-918b-4523e1bb2e75".
         "x-ms-user-id": "7cb2f429-a54a-46c3-8e4f-df3a3032f249",
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         "_owningbusinessunit_value@Microsoft.Dynamics.CRM.lookuplogicalname": "
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         "cr6e4_name": "Daniel Wood",
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         "ItemInternalId": "f1ef4327-4135-ee11-bdf4-6045bd8f7e0b",
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         "RunAsSystemUserId": "b3671a7c-c17d-ec11-8d21-000d3a2f76f7",
          "RowVersion": "12774383"
```

LCNC is an opportunity for more visibility than ever before

AppSec for LCNC apps

- 1. Business users w/ no awareness
- 2. No SDLC
- 3. Most controls don't apply
- 4. 10x-100x more apps / year





Learn more: github.com/mbrg/talks

Twitter: @mbrg0

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