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# Low Code High Risk: Enterprise Domination via Low Code Abuse

Michael Bargury @ Zenity BSides NYC 2023

## About me

- OWASP LCNC Top 10 project lead
- CTO and co-founder @ Zenity
- Ex MSFT cloud security
- Dark Reading columnist





## Disclaimer

This talk is presented from an attacker's perspective with the goal of raising awareness to the risks of underestimating the security impact of Low Code. Low Code is awesome.


## Outline

- Low Code in a nutshell
- Low Code attacks observed in the wild
  - Living off the land account takeover, lateral movement, PrivEsc, data exfil
  - Hiding in plain sight
  - Leveraging predictable misconfigs from the outside
- How to defend
- The latest addition to your red team arsenal

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#### Low Code in a Nutshell

# Exponential Growth in Business Development





# Why Low Code?



# If it sounds familiar, its because it is

🚰 Microsoft Visual Basic - No








**Tech evolution** 

Build everything

If this than that automation

- Integrations
- Business apps
- Whole products
- Mobile apps



When a new email arrives

michaelbargury@zenity.io

Show raw outputs >

## Available in every major enterprise























# Recap

- ✓Available on every major enterprise
- √ Has access to business data and powers business processes
- ✓ Runs as SaaS (difficult to monitor)
- ✓Underrated by IT/Sec




#### **Low Code Attacks In The Wild**

Living off the land



youtu.be/5naPxs0fEJc

## Step by step




#### Behind the scenes










How does the app authenticate to slack?


How do different users get authenticated by the same app?

#### Behind the scenes






# Ready, set, AUTOMATE!




Connections in Zenity Stage (default		<b>@</b>	ge.com Microsoft Dataverse (legacy)	Ø	b@zenity.io		1 d ago
		9	Bitbucket Bitbucket (preview)	_	Azure Key Vault  MSN Weather		5 mo ago
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	aseResourceUrl}	Ξ	Office 365 Management API  ConnectionToFadiStorageAccount	0		•••	5 d ago
	TP with Azure AD		Azure Blob Storage	28	@gmail.com OneDrive		9 mo ago
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SQL	/stage.com L Server	@	ge.com Microsoft Dataverse	<b>~</b>	rstage.com Salesforce		2 wk ago
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
## Credential Sharing as a Service




## Credential Sharing as a Service




#### Ransomware thru action connections






Ransomware




# Exfiltrate email thru the platform's email account



#### Move to machine




# Introducing ZapCreds



github.com/mbrg/zapcreds

# Can we fool users to create connections for us?


- Set up a bait app that does something useful
- Generate connections on-the-fly
- Fool users to use it
- Pwn their connection (i.e. account)






youtu.be/vJZpNJRC\_10

# Can we get rid of this pesky approve window?



# Can we get rid of this pesky approve window?





https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powerapps.administration.powershell/set-adminpowerappapistobypassconsent




# Low Code Attacks In The Wild

Can I stay here forever?




#### This has been done before



zenity.io/blog/hackers-abuse-low-code-platforms-and-turn-them-against-their-owners/

# Dump files and tweet about it on a schedule



# **Encrypt on command**




### Persistency


What do we want?

- ☐ Remote execution
- ■Arbitrary payloads
- ☐ Maintain access (even if user account access get revokes)
- ☐ Avoid detection
- □ Avoid attribution
- □ No logs

## Persistency v1




# Persistency v1



What do we want?


## Persistency v1



What do we want?

**☑** Remote execution


**⊠Arbitrary** payloads



What do we want?


☑ Remote execution

**☑** Maintain access




#### What do we want?

- ☑ Remote execution
- ☑ Maintain access
- **☑** Avoid detection




#### What do we want?


- ☑ Remote execution
- ☑ Máintain access
- ☑ Avoid attribution



#### What do we want?

- ☑ Remote execution
- ☑ Maintain access
- Avoid detection
- ☑Avoid \_\_attribution
- **⊠No logs**





### Solving persistency

Our current state:

- ☑ Remote execution
- **⊠** Arbitrary payloads
- ☑ Avoid detection
- ☑ Avoid attribution
- **⊠No logs**

## **Executing arbitrary commands**

### Power Automate Management

Power Automate Management connector enables interaction with Power Automate Management service. For example: creating, editing, and updating flows. Administrators who want to perform operations with admin privileges should call actions with the 'as Admin' suffix.


☐ See documentation






https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/connectors/flowmanagement/

# Introducing Powerful!





github.com/mbrg/powerful




## List authenticated sessions to use


## Create a flow





#### Delete a flow






```
from explore.flow_factory.client import EXAMPLE, FlowFactory
WEBHOOK = "https://logic.azure.com:443/workflows/<workflow id>/triggers/manual/paths/invoke?api-version=2016-06-01&sig=<sig>"
factory = FlowFactory(webhook=WEBHOOK)
connections = factory.get connections(environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"])
flow = factory.create flow(
   environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"],
   flow_display_name=EXAMPLE["flowDisplayName"],
   flow state=EXAMPLE["flowState"],
   flow definition=EXAMPLE["flowDefinition"],
   connection references=EXAMPLE["connectionReferences"],
factory.run flow(environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"], flow id=flow["name"])
factory.delete flow(environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"], flow id=flow["name"])
```

github.com/mbrg/powerful

## Powerful (persistency v3)



- 1. Set up your flow factory
- 2. Control it though API and a Python CLI

What do we want?

☑ Remote
\_\_execution

✓ Arbitrary

√ Maintain access

✓ Avoid detection

attribution

✓ No logs


github.com/mbrg/powerful




### **Low Code Attacks In The Wild**

From the outside looking in

### Power Portals/Pages?





## Create an engaging headline, welcome, or call to action

Add a call to action here



## What's ODATA and why should we care

"An open protocol to allow the creation and consumption of queryable and interoperable RESTful APIs in a simple and standard way."

Power portals can be configured to provide access to SQL tables through ODATA using a specific URL:

portal.powerappsportals.com/\_odata

## What's ODATA and why should we care

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zenity.io/blog/the-microsoft-power-apps-portal-data-leak-revisited-are-you-safe-now/


### The fun begins

Goal: find misconfigured portals that expose sensitive data w/o auth.

#### Real world example:

### Nothing to see here

### /\_odata/globalvariables:



### Can we scale it?

Recall the portal url:


zenzen123.powerappsportals.com

### Can we scale it?

Recall the portal url:

a zenzen123.powerappsportals.com

Let's use Bing!




zenity.io/blog/the-microsoft-power-apps-portal-data-leak-revisited-are-you-safe-now/


### ODATA leak - what we found

- Vulnerability disclosures are in progress
- Found
  - PII emails, names, calendar events
  - Secrets API keys, authentication tokens
  - Business data sales accounts, business contacts, vendor lists

## Can we find more exposed data?



### Can we find more exposed data?



Secrets are secured by a random GUID

# Storage by Zapier API


```
'how does it work?": {
 "always provide either `?secret=12345` or `X-Secret: 12345`":
  GET /api/records": [
   "will return a full object of all values stored by default.",
   "you can also specify only the keys you want via the".
   "querystring like`?key=color&key=age`."
 "POST /api/records": [
   "provide a body with a json object with keys/values you want",
   "to store like `{\"color\": \"blue\", \"age\": 29}`."
 "DELETE /api/records": [
   "completely clear all the records in this account"
 "PATCH /api/records": [
   "A data with a particular schema needs to be received.",
   "The schema specifies which action to do and with what parameters.",
   "For example {\"action\": \"increment by\", \"data\": {\"key\": \"<key
   "The following actions are currently supported:",
   "increment by",
   "set_value_if",
   "remove child value",
   "set child value",
   "list push",
   "list pop"
 "For more about information about Storage by Zapier actions check out our
```

# Storage by Zapier API

```
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   "A data wi
               '12345' is not a
                                                    what parameters."
   "The schem
   "For examp
   "The follow
                         GUID...
   "increment
   "set value
   "remove ch
   "set child value",
   "list push",
   "list pop"
 "For more about information about Storage by Zapier actions check out our
```

## Let's see what happens..

Let's see what happens.. profit 400\$



zenity.io/blog/zapier-storage-exposes-sensitive-customer-data-due-to-poor-user-choices/

## Summary

- Low Code is
  - Huge in the enterprise
  - Underrated by security teams
- Attackers are taking advantage of it by
  - Living off the land account takeover, lateral movement, PrivEsc, data exfil
  - Hiding in plain sight
  - Leveraging predictable misconfigs from the outside
- The latest addition to your red team arsenal
  - ZapCreds identify overshared creds
  - Powerful install a low code backdoor
- How to defend your org

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### **How To Stay Safe?**

### Do these 4 things to reduce your risk

- 1. Review configuration
  - Bypass consent flag (Microsoft)
  - Limit connector usage
- 2. Review and monitor access for external-facing endpoints
  - Webhooks
  - ODATA (Microsoft)
  - Storage (Zapier)
- 3. Review connections shared across the entire organization
- 4. Leverage the <a href="OWASP LCNC Top 10">OWASP LCNC Top 10</a>

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Learn more: github.com/mbrg/talks

Twitter: @mbrg0

## Low Code High Risk: Enterprise Domination via Low Code Abuse

Michael Bargury @ Zenity BSides NYC 2023