

Michael Bargury (@mbrg0)

Dominating the Enterprise via Low Code Abuse

github.com/mbrg/talks

Zenity



About me

- CTO and co-founder @ Zenity
- Ex MSFT cloud security
- OWASP 'Top 10 LCNC Security Risks' project lead
- Dark Reading columnist





@mbrg0 ft. @UZisReal123



bit.ly/lcsec



Disclaimer


This talk is presented from an attacker's perspective with the goal of raising awareness to the risks of underestimating the security impact of Low Code. Low Code is awesome.



Outline

- Low Code in a nutshell
- Low Code attacks observed in the wild
 - Living off the land account takeover, lateral movement, PrivEsc, data exfil
 - Hiding in plane sight
 - Leveraging predictable misconfigs from the outside
- How to defend
- The latest addition to your red team arsenal








Why Low Code?







If this sounds familiar, its because it is









Tech evolution


Save Gmail attachments to your Google Drive • Ran at 6/25/2022 2:11:21 PM

When a new email arrives



Build everything

- If this than that automation
- Integrations
- Business apps
- Whole products
- Mobile apps





Available in every major enterprise



























Recap

- ✓ Available on every major enterprise
- ✓ Has access to business data and powers business processes
- ✓ Runs as SaaS (difficult to monitor)
- ✓ Underrated by IT/Sec













Step by step

My connections 1

Slack @michaelbargury (pwntoso)

@michaelbargury (pwntoso) - added 21 seconds ago





 \times

ks by Kris S. •••




Behind the scenes










How does the app authenticate to slack?

How do different users get authenticated by the same app?



Behind the scenes




RESTful API defined in swagger




Storing and sharing refresh tokens



Ready, set, AUTOMATE!








Dominating the Enterprise via Low Code Abuse

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	— Azure blob storage	5681@gmail.com OneDrive	··· 9 mo ago
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stage.com Power Apps for Makers	File System File System	Aviv-Demo ServiceNow	··· 8 mo ago
stage.com Power Apps for Admins	Notifications Notifications	SFTP SFTP	··· 9 mo ago
Planner stage.com	Vendor Server FTP	SFTP - SSH SFTP - SSH	··· 8 mo ago
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


Credential Sharing as a Service







Credential Sharing as a Service






Ransomware thru action connections





☑ Ransomware






Exfiltrate email thru the platform's email account

☑ Data exfiltration



win11

Move to machine



Status


Connected


Connected

Connected

2.14.173.21294

Flows que...






Kris S..

Kris S..



Introducing ZapCreds



github.com/mbrg/zapcreds



Can we fool users to create connections for us?

- Set up a bait app that does something useful
- Generate connections on-the-fly
- Fool users to use it
- Pwn their connection (i.e. account)






youtu.be/vJZpNJRC_10





Can we get rid of this pesky approve window?





Can we get rid of this pesky approve window?













This has been done before





Dump files and tweet about it on a schedule





Encrypt on command







What do we want?

- ☐ Remote execution
- ☐ Arbitrary payloads
- ☐ Maintain access (even if user account access get revokes)
- Avoid detection
- Avoid attribution
- □ No logs










What do we want?






What do we want?

☑ Remote execution☑ Arbitrary payloads






What do we want?

- ☑ Remote execution
- **☑** Maintain access






What do we want?

- ☑ Remote execution
- ✓ Maintain access
- Avoid detection






What do we want?

- ☑ Remote execution
- ☑ Maintain access
- ☑ Avoid detection
- Avoid attribution







What do we want?


- ☑ Remote execution
- ☑ Maintain access
- ☑ Avoid detection
- Avoid attribution
- **⋈** No logs












What do we want?

No logs





Solving persistency

Our current state:

- ☑ Remote execution
- **⋈** Arbitrary payloads
- ☑ Maintain access
- ☑ Avoid detection
- ☑ Avoid attribution
- **⋈** No logs



Executing arbitrary commands

Power Automate Management

Power Automate Management connector enables interaction with Power Automate Management service. For example: creating, editing, and updating flows. Administrators who want to perform operations with admin privileges should call actions with the 'as Admin' suffix.


☐ See documentation








Introducing Powerful!











Create a flow




List authenticated sessions to use



Delete a flow

Case deleteFlow		
*Equals deleteFlow		
Delete Flow		⊚ 🗛 …
* Environment	Commands Inp ×	×
*Flow	♀ Commands Inp ×	×

Dominating the Enterprise via Low Code Abuse






```
from explore.flow factory.client import EXAMPLE, FlowFactory
WEBHOOK = "https://logic.azure.com:443/workflows/<workflow id>/triggers/manual/paths/invoke?api-version=2016-06-01&sig=<sig>"
factory = FlowFactory(webhook=WEBHOOK)
# find authenticated sessions to leverage
connections = factory.get connections(environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"])
flow = factory.create flow(
    environment_id=EXAMPLE["environment"],
    flow display name=EXAMPLE["flowDisplayName"],
    flow state=EXAMPLE["flowState"],
    flow definition=EXAMPLE["flowDefinition"],
    connection references=EXAMPLE["connectionReferences"],
factory.run flow(environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"], flow id=flow["name"])
factory.delete_flow(environment id=EXAMPLE["environment"], flow id=flow["name"])
```



Powerful (persistency v3)



- 1. Set up your flow factory
- 2. Control it though API and a Python CLI

What do we want?

- ☑ Remote execution
- ☑ Arbitrary payloads
- ✓ Maintain access
- Avoid detection
- ✓ Avoid attribution
- ✓ No logs

github.com/mbrg/powerful









Power Portals/Pages?









Create an engaging headline, welcome, or call to action

Add a call to action here





What's ODATA and why should we care

"An open protocol to allow the creation and consumption of queryable and interoperable RESTful APIs in a simple and standard way."

Power portals can be configured to provide access to SQL tables through ODATA using a specific URL:

portal.powerappsportals.com/_odata



What's ODATA and why should we care

"An open protocol to allow the creation and consumption of queryable and interoperable RESTful APIs in a simple and

standard way."

Power portals can be configured to provide access to SQL tables through ODATA using a specific URL:

portal.powerappsportals.com/_odata



By Design: How Default Permissions on Microsoft Power Apps Exposed Millions





The fun begins


Goal: find misconfigured portals that expose sensitive data w/o auth.

Real world example:



Nothing to see here

/_odata/globalvariables:





Can we scale it?

Recall the portal url:

zenzen 123. powerappsportals.com




Can we scale it?

Recall the portal url:

zenzen 123. powerappsportals.com

Let's use Bing!



zenity.io/blog/the-microsoft-power-apps-portal-data-leak-revisited-are-you-safe-now/




ODATA leak - what we found

- Vulnerability disclosures are in progress
- Found
 - PII emails, names, calendar events
 - Secrets API keys, authentication tokens
 - Business data sales accounts, business contacts, vendor lists



Can we find more exposed data?





Can we find more exposed data?



Store data from code steps with StoreClient

Last updated: July 23, 2020

The StoreClient is a built-in utility available in both **Python** and **JavaScript** code steps that lets you store and retrieve data between Zaps or between runs of the same Zap.

Limitations

- Any JSON serializable value can be saved.
- The secret should use UUID4 format.
- Every key must be less than 32 characters in length.
- Every value must be less than 2500 bytes.
- Only 500 keys may be saved per secret.
- Keys will expire if you do not touch them in 3 months.

Secrets are secured by a random GUID



Storage by Zapier API

```
how does it work?": {
 "always provide either `?secret=12345` or `X-Secret: 12345`": "",
 "GET /api/records": [
   "will return a full object of all values stored by default.",
   "you can also specify only the keys you want via the",
   "querystring like`?key=color&key=age`."
 "POST /api/records": [
   "provide a body with a json object with keys/values you want",
   "to store like `{\"color\": \"blue\", \"age\": 29}`."
 "DELETE /api/records": [
   "completely clear all the records in this account"
 "PATCH /api/records": [
   "A data with a particular schema needs to be received.",
   "The schema specifies which action to do and with what parameters.",
   "For example {\"action\": \"increment_by\", \"data\": {\"key\": \"<key
   "The following actions are currently supported:",
   "increment by",
   "set value if",
   "remove_child_value",
   "set child value",
   "list push",
   "list_pop"
 "For more about information about Storage by Zapier actions check out our
```



Storage by Zapier API

```
.....", "....."
how does it work?": {
 "always provide either `?secret=12345` or `X-Secret: 12345`": "",
 "GET /api/records": [
  "will return a full object of all values stored by default.",
   "you can also specify only the keys you want via the",
   "querystring like`?key=color&key=age`."
 "POST /api/records": [
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 "DELETE /api/records": [
   "completely clear all the records in this account"
 "PATCH /api/records": [
   "A data with a particular schema meeds to be received "
                                                       barameters.",
  "The schema
                                                       \"key\": \"<key
  "For example
                   '12345' is not a
  "The followi
  "increment b
  "set value i
                            GUID...
  "remove_chil
  "set child v
  "list push",
  "list_pop"
 "For more about information about Storage by Zapier actions check out our
```



Let's see what happens..

```
aaliyah
aaren
aarika
aaron
aartjan
aarushi
abagael
abagail
abahri
abbas
abbe
abbey
abbi
abbie
abby
abbye
abdalla
abdallah
abdul
abdullah
abe
```


https://store.zapier.com/api/records?secret=

{"error": "Secrets must be valid UUID4s."}



Let's see what happens.. profit!

400\$ bounty



zenity.io/blog/zapier-storage-exposes-sensitive-customer-data-due-to-poor-user-choices/



Summary

- Low Code is
 - Huge in the enterprise
 - Underrated by security teams
- Attackers are taking advantage of it by
 - Living off the land account takeover, lateral movement, PrivEsc, data exfil
 - Hiding in plane sight
 - Leveraging predictable misconfigs from the outside
- The latest addition to your red team arsenal
 - ZapCreds identify overshared creds
 - Powerful install a low code backdoor
- How to defend your org







Do these 4 things to reduce your risk

- 1. Review configuration
 - Bypass consent flag (Microsoft)
 - Limit connector usage
- 2. Review and monitor access for external-facing endpoints
 - Webhooks
 - ODATA (Microsoft)
 - Storage (Zapier)
- 3. Review connections shared across the entire organization
- 4. Learn more at <u>OWASP</u>, <u>Dark Reading</u>, <u>Zenity blog</u>



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